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Abstract. Railway turnouts are fundamental mechanical infrastructures, which allow a rolling 
stock to divert one direction to another. As those are of a large number of engineering sub-
systems, e.g. track, signalling, earthworks, these particular sub-systems are expected to induce 
high potential through various kind of failure mechanisms. This could be a cause of any 
catastrophic event. A derailment, one of undesirable events in railway operation, often results, 
albeit rare occurs, in damaging to rolling stock, railway infrastructure and disrupt service, and 
has the potential to cause casualties and even loss of lives. As a result, it is quite significant that 
a well-designed risk analysis is performed to create awareness of hazards and to identify what 
parts of the systems may be at risk. This study will focus on all types of environment based 
failures as a result of numerous contributing factors noted officially as accident reports. This risk 
analysis is designed to help industry to minimise the occurrence of accidents at railway turnouts. 
The methodology of the study relies on accurate assessment of derailment likelihood, and is 
based on statistical multiple factors-integrated accident rate analysis. The study is prepared in 
the way of establishing product risks and faults, and showing the impact of potential process by 
Boolean algebra. 
1.  Introduction 
Derailment is an undesirable phenomenon causing damage to rolling stock and infrastructure as well as 
service disruptions, and which might also cause casualties and harm the environment. Moreover, these 
effects might result in serious reputation and financial losses to railway companies and organisations, 
as well as social, mental and economic consequences to the public. Although EU members have claimed 
that train operating safety is constantly improving and the number of derailments across the EU has been 
slightly improved, there appear to have been around 500 derailments per year in the last ten years, of 
which 7% (35 derailments) involved catastrophic consequences [1]. On average, catastrophic 
derailments potentially result in 30 fatalities per year, each of which costs, on average, 10M£ [2].  
As for the situation in the UK, Network Rail has 21,000 track miles and 19,000 turnouts [3]. In other 
words, it can be said that there is one turnout per 1,14 track mile. As a result, a large number of 
derailments, accounting for 46% potentially higher-risk train accidents over the last 10 years, has 
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occurred at British turnouts [4]. Causes of a derailment are often truck and turnout component failures, 
malicious operational failures, loading faults, environmental conditions, human factors, interaction 
problems or a combination of them [5]. 
2.  Literature Review and Related Studies 
The purpose of Fault tree analysis (FTA) lies in revealing a single system failure mode and qualitative 
information on how a relevant event may occur and what consequences this event can cause [6]. Many 
studies on various aspects of railway safety are formed of FTA-including methodologies. Pei et al. [7] 
proposed a fault tree analysis method combined with quantitative analysis to investigate high-speed 
railway accidents. Li et al. [8] discussed the train crash accident from a broader viewpoint, and analysed 
the train crash accident related safety issues through the fault tree model of the train rear-end. Leveson 
[9] used FTA to reach a detailed diagram of the contributing causes of accidents. Yao [10] introduced 
an improved intelligent system for railway safety-focused risk analysis on the basis on fuzzy-FTA. 
Jafarian and Rezvani [11] also used fuzzy based FTA to examine train derailments and to acquire an 
exact estimation of event occurrence rates and its distribution function along with significant causes. 
Lin et al. [12] proposed probabilistic risk assessment methodology based on FTA for analysing adjacent 
track accidents risk. More specifically, this proposal has a structure, identifying scenarios for adjacent 
track accidents to fulfil a quantitative probability analysis derived from Boolean algebra on the basis of 
the results of the fault tree analysis.    
On the other hand, the investigation of natural hazard has been getting popular within the industry 
over the last few years.  Saadin eat al. [13] investigated to what degree a HSR line between Singapore 
and Malesia, on-going project, will be affected during operation by severe weather conditions such as 
rainfall, lightning, wind and very high temperatures. Dindar et al. [14] examined the diversity of railway 
turnout related derailment risk arising from natural hazards and build relations between derailment 
accidents and environmental conditions. Baker et al. [15] studied the effects of high summer 
temperatures due to climate change on buckling. As for managing risk, only two management 
frameworks aimed to reduce risk of natural hazard at RTSs have been proposed [16] [17].  Along with 
proposed management techniques, risk analysis methods were discussed to identify what the techniques 
such as FTA, event tree, Bayesian risk analysis, are suitable to what parts of RTSs [18] [19]. This study 
has suggested FTA to manage risk induced by environmental conditions for turnouts.  
Thus, this research establishes a risk analysis based on FTA for investigating the impact of nature on 
RTSs. The establishment is built on investigation of accident cases along with aforementioned 
researches; ref. 12, 14 and 18, and thus, the gap of this related research area is filled.   
3.  Fault Tree Analysis in Railway Researches     
 
Fault tree analysis is a deductive technique which enables the building of causal relations resulting in a 
given undesired event. This analysis approach begins with a defined system failure event and reveals 
backward its causes, down to the primary independent faults, concentrating on a single system failure 
mode [20].  
 To complete the construction of a fault tree, it is firstly necessary to use a system flow diagram for an 
understanding of how the system functions. The diagram depicts the pathways by which goals are 
transmitted through components of the system. The steps in fault tree construction are as follows: 
I. The selection of the system failure event of interest, known as the top event. The following 
event or events is/are considered with regard to its/ their effect on the top event.  
II. Identification of contributing events, which might directly cause the top event to occur. As such, 
four possibilities exist: 
a. primary failure of the device (e.g. aging, fatigue) 
b. secondary failure of the device (e.g. earthquake) 
c. no input to the device 
d. human error in actuating or installing the device 
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If one of these events alone is enough to contribute to the system fault, they are linked to the top 
event through ‘an OR function`. If all of the events are required for system fault, they are related to the 
top event through ‘an AND function’ [21]. These functions are illustrated in figure 1, modified from 
[22].  
 
 Figure 1 The structure of FTA 
  
Basic events (BEs), one of the common symbols used in FTA in figure 1, are the lowest level events 
within a branch. BEs bring about the occurrence of the top event in FTA. Intermediate events (IEs) help 
to describe events located between BEs and the events. Conditioning events (CAs) are a restriction on a 
logic gate in the diagram 
GATE 1
Train 
Derailment 
SPAD (signal 
passed at danger) 
GATE 2 
Conditions for 
derailment 
Train approaching 
red signal Failures 
EVENT 1 GATE 3 
Turnout/points not 
set Speed and alignment 
EVENT 7
GATE 6 
AND Gate: The output event occurs 
if all input events occur 
OR Gate: The output event occurs if 
one of the input events occurs Basic event: A triggering event like component failure, human error 
 Intermediate events: Description of events (e.g.) High speed train 
GATE 4
Lack of 
maintenance
GATE 5
 Conditioning event: Specific conditions or restrictions to any 
logic gate 
INHIBIT Gate: The output event 
occurs if the (single) input event 
occurs in the presence of an 
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4.  Environmental Failures Mechanisms in RTSs 
Extreme environmental conditions such as high temperature, floods, and storm tides are known to be 
responsible for many derailments at RTSs [23]. Thus, it is necessary to take measurements against the 
associated potential effects of extreme weather.   
 
Table 1 Environmental-based Failure Mechanism Resulting in Derailment on Turnouts [24] 
Failure type Environmental reason Features
Buildup of ice or snow 
Snow precipitation Filling the gap between stock rail and switch blade  
Progressive shear failure 
High water content Squeezing near subgrade surface 
Depression under ties  
Changes in Aerodynamics High wind or Tornado Blowing railway trains off turnouts 
Excessive plastic deformation Repeated freezing and thawing Ballast pocket
Electricity failures Flood/Heavy rain Unusable of switch motor  
Attrition with mud pumping High water contact at subgrade surface Poor drainageMuddy ballast 
Inadequate sub-ballast 
Frost action Low temperature/ Frost susceptible soil Often occurs winter/spring season 
Buckling High temperature Turnout geometry problems 
Swelling/Shrinkage Changing moisture content Rough track surface 
Brittle components  Extreme cold temperature Component failures Separated or broken components 
Washout A heavy downpour of rain Turnout geometry problems 
Aerodynamic Forces 
 
Slides 
High wind
Subsurface water 
Existence of mud  
Poor designed trackbed 
Soil washed or blown away 
Muddy track 
 
Table 1 is prepared by considering accident reports of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
and shows common reported failure types associated with their environmental reasons and features. For 
instance, when high water content exists in trackbed layers for some reason, it is highly likely that this 
contributes to irregularities in track geometry, resulting in progressive shear failure, attrition, washout 
etc. On the other hand, extreme low temperature might cause brittle tracks and broken or separated rail 
at RTSs, as illustrated in table 1.  
5.  FTA Structure and Discussion   
5.1.   Assignment of Gates in the FTA for RTSs 
The consideration of changes in temperature in railway industry is vital to ensure a smooth railway 
operation. The changes contribute to temperature-induced influences on the derailment as buckling, 
thermal expansion of track, uneven thermal expansion or contraction, brittle. Thus, it might be said that 
51234567890
WMCAUS IOP Publishing
IOP Conf. Series: Materials Science and Engineering 245 (2017) 042020 doi:10.1088/1757-899X/245/4/042020
there are two temperature based variants, namely high temperature (Th) and low temperature (Tl). 
However, excessive plastic deformation resulted primarily from fluctuation in temperatures that causes 
repeated freezing and thawing in trackbed. Thus, fluctuation in temperatures is symbolised as (Tf) 
Precipitation might fall in either solid or liquid phases, or transition. As the number of turnout related 
derailments by environmental based reasons is quite low and data is scarce, the authors decided only 
consider two variants which makes FTA as calculatable as possible. Therefore, these two forms can be 
called and abbreviated as solid precipitation (SP), liquid precipitation (LP). SP and LP are one of the 
most common cause of derailments at RTSs, resulting in many events associated with flooding, runoff 
and antecedent rains which lead to soft and saturated trackbed, or create washouts undermining RTSs, 
or cause accumulations of snow and ice. In addition to SP and LP, the high amount of precipitation in a 
short time might result in flood causing electricity faults. Therefore, flood is denoted as F.  
Accidents associated with high winds have also been reported commonly. If they reach 
aerodynamically enough speed, rolling stocks at RTSs can be blown off tracks and cause derailment.   
 
5.2.  Scenarios and structure of the FTA for RTSs 
The environmental based faults on RTSs is discussed in Section 4, and variants of environmental impacts 
is discussed in Section 5.1. To implement the FTA and its corresponding probability model for RTSs, 
those sections are considered, which allows to estimate the derailment rate for a specific turnout. 
However, it is should not be forgotten that the rates are likely to be quiet low as the number of derailment 
is not high. The structure of FTA is shown in figure 2. The suggested FTA consists of 5 IEs, 6 different 
CEs, 12 BEs and a top event that is environmental cause related derailment at RTSs. CEs are assigned 
to some events.  For instance, excessive plastic deformation (T4), responsible for turnout trackbed fault, 
can occurs given that repeated freezing and thawing in trackbed (Tf) exist. Therefore, the basic event, 
excessive plastic deformation, is related to Tf in the FTA. On the other hand, washout (T3), which is the 
sudden erosion of trackbed underlying a turnout, only occurs when a gush of water exists. Therefore, it 
is no need to tie it with a condition.  
Assuming that all basic events in the FTA are mutually independent each other, each probability has 
to correspond to the cumulative probability of lower level events. A basic event with a conditioning 
event or more is calculated as follow (Distributive Law);  
 
ܺ ∩ ሺܻ	 ∪ 	ܼሻ 	ൌ 	 ሺܺ	 ∩ ܻሻ 	∪ 	ሺܺ	 ∩ ܼሻ 	ൌ 	ܺ	 ⋅ 	 ሺܻ	 ൅ ܼሻ 	ൌ 	ܺ	 ⋅ ܻ	 ൅ ܺ	 ⋅ ܼ                  (1) 
 
Thus, probability of derailment can be calculated as follow: 
 
ܦ் ൌ ܩ ൅ ܶ ൅ ܱ ൅ ܥ ൅ ܧ ൅ ܣ      (2)  
ܦ் ൌ ሺܩଵ ൅ ௅ܶ௦ܩଶሻ ൅ ሺሺܣ௠ௗ ൅ ܵ ௠ܲ௣ሻ ଵܶ ൅ ሺܮ ௣ܲ௦௙ ൅ ܵ ௣ܲ௦௙ሻ ଶܶ ൅ ଷܶ	൅	 ிܶ		 ସܶ ൅ 	 ௅ܶ௙	 ହܶ	ሻ ൅ ሺܯܨ௦௕ ଵܱ
൅	ሺ ௅ܶ௜ ൅ ܮ ௜ܵሻܱଶሻ ൅		 ௅ܶ௕ܥଵ ൅ ܨܧଵ ൅ ܣ           (3) 
 
Therefore, the probability of  ܦ் is found out in Boolean algebra as  
 
ܦ் ൌ ܩଵ ൅ ௅ܶ௦ܩଶ ൅ ଵܶܣ௠ௗ ൅ ଵܶܵ ௠ܲ௣ ൅ ଶܶܮ ௣ܲ௦௙ ൅ ଶܶܵ ௣ܲ௦௙ ൅ ଷܶ	൅	 ிܶ		 ସܶ ൅ 	 ௅ܶ௙	 ହܶ 	൅ ܯܨ௦௕ ଵܱ ൅
	ܱଶ ௅ܶ௜ ൅ ܱଶܮ ௜ܵ ൅		 ௅ܶ௕ܥଵ ൅ ܨܧଵ ൅ ܣ      (4)  
 
where the variables are as defined in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 The structure of FTA aiming to environmental causes of derailments at  RTSs 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
This study investigates environmental causes of derailments at RTSs. In order to do this, various 
elements and variables that contribute to the occurrence of faults and failures and thereby the top event, 
derailment, explored and determined systematically. The FTA is developed by using Boolean algebra, 
which allows for calculation of branches of the tree, and revealing the logical relationship between 
contributing elements in the FTA. On the other hand, impacts of all risk elements created only by the 
nature on derailment risk at RTSs are discussed. This is the first work contributing to many future studies 
in this fields, and enables them to involve quantitative derivation of probabilities.  
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